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Abstract 
An expert with general knowledge trains a cash-constrained novice. Faster training increases the 
novice’s productivity and his ability to compensate the expert; it also shrinks the stock of knowledge yet 
to be transferred, reducing the expert’s ability to retain the novice. The profit-maximizing agreement is 
a multi-period apprenticeship in which knowledge is transferred gradually over time. The expert adopts 
a "1/e rule" whereby, at the beginning of the relationship, the novice is trained just enough to produce a 
fraction 1/e of the efficient output. This rule causes inefficiently lengthy relationships that grow longer 
the more patient the players. We discuss policy interventions. 
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1 Introduction
As noted by Becker (1994[1964]), training involves a transfer of human capital; thus, un-
like other market transactions, it does not create an asset that can be used as collateral.
Moreover, the novice (apprentice) often does not have the means to pay the expert (mas-
ter), up front, for the knowledge he wishes to acquire. In this case, the rate of knowledge
transfer is constrained by the need to ensure that, over time, the novice has both the
means and the incentives to compensate the expert for his training. Unlike in the rst-
best allocation, where knowledge is transferred as fast as technologically feasible, the rate
of knowledge transfer is the result of a trade-o¤: the faster it is, the sooner output can
be generated; but if it is too fast, the novice will leave without fully compensating the
expert. For example, in professional partnerships, novices, usually called associates,
are rewarded for their work not only through their current salary, but also through the
promise of future learning. Such an arrangement allows partners to prot while asso-
ciates are being trained. Similarly, in international joint ventures involving technological
transfers between a northernrm (the expert) and a southernrm (the novice), the
latter can potentially ignore formal agreements and establish its own operations. As a
result, the rate of knowledge transfer is constrained by the need to ensure a high enough
continuation value for both partners.
The object of this paper is to study, in an environment with limited contractability,
the form and duration of the optimal dynamic relationship between expert and novice.
The goal, in particular, is to explore the speed at which knowledge is transferred, together
with its distributional and e¢ ciency implications.
We set up a simple model in which an expert and a novice, both of whom are risk-
neutral, interact repeatedly over time. The expert (she) has a stock of general-purpose,
perfectly-divisible knowledge. The novice (he), in contrast, has no knowledge, and there-
fore no ability to produce output; he also has no cash, and therefore no ability to purchase
knowledge from the expert. By transferring knowledge, the expert can raise the novices
productivity and, with it, his ability to transfer capital back to the expert. The compli-
cation, however, is that at any time the novice may choose to leave the relationship with
the knowledge already acquired and enjoy the output he is able to produce, on his own,
with this knowledge. Since knowledge is non-contractable and general purpose, the only
repercussion is an end to the playersinteractions.
To build a productive relationship in the face of both the novices cash constraint and
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his temptation to walk away from the expert, players rely on a self-enforcing agreement
in which knowledge is transferred gradually over time. Such an agreement is capable
of sustaining knowledge transfers from the expert by providing an expectation of future
payments from the novice; these payments are sustained, in turn, via the expectation of
further knowledge transfers from the expert.
As a benchmark, we rst consider relational contracts in which, by assumption, all
knowledge transfers must end after two periods. The optimal arrangement is forward-
looking: the initial knowledge transfer is used as a knowledge gift(rather than a loan)
that allows the novice to produce output before the overall knowledge transfer is over;
and the nal knowledge transfer is used as an incentive for the novice to surrender such
output. In this two-period arrangement, the experts only source of revenue is the output
produced in the rst period, using the knowledge gift, which means that the expert is
under pressure to make this gift as large as possible. Because of this pressure, for realistic
values of the playersdiscount factor, the arrangement is close to rst best (and converges
to rst best when the discount factor converges to one).
We next turn to the general case in which the expert selects a multi-period arrangement
of any desired length. The optimal contract is an apprenticeshiparrangement in which,
until the knowledge transfer is complete, players trade labor for training. The structure
of this contract generalizes the two-period arrangement: after an initial knowledge gift,
the novice is asked to work for the expert in exchange for additional knowledge that has a
(discounted) value just high enough to compensate the novice for this work. Equivalently,
this arrangement can be structured as an initial knowledge gift followed by a series of
sales contracts in which, until all knowledge has been sold, the novice devotes 100% of his
output to gradually purchase new knowledge. By delaying consumption until training is
complete, the expert more quickly extract rents from the novice.
The overall length of this apprenticeship is controlled by the size of the initial knowl-
edge gift, with a smaller gift leading to a more distant graduation. When selecting the
optimal gift, the expert faces the following trade-o¤: a larger gift raises the novices
productivity, allowing the expert to extract higher revenues during each period of the ap-
prenticeship; but a larger gift also reduces the amount of knowledge yet to be transferred,
reducing the number of apprenticeship periods that the novice is willing to withstand.
Because of the multi-period nature of the agreement, the expert is in much less of a
rush, relative to the two-period setting, to raise the novices productivity early in the
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relationship.
We nd that, no matter how patient players are, and regardless of the details of
the output technology, the optimal knowledge gift allows the novice to produce, at the
beginning of the relationship, a fraction 1
e
of the e¢ cient output level (where e is the
mathematical constant). This 1
e
ruleleads to long apprenticeships in which signicant
output is wasted. For example, when the annual interest rate is 10% (resp. 5%), training
takes 9.5 years (resp. 19.5 years) to complete. This rule also implies that, in the absence
of other factors a¤ecting the relationship, novices with di¤erent skill levels, and novices
working in di¤erent professions, take equally long to train.
The optimal apprenticeship is longer, and knowledge is transferred more slowly, the
more patient the players (thus, unlike in the two-period contract, more surplus is wasted
when players are more patient). The reason is that, when patience increases, knowledge
becomes more valuable in the margin (as the novice can use the acquired knowledge during
every subsequent period of his life). Consequently, in any given period the novice is willing
to work for the expert in exchange for a smaller amount of new knowledge; a fact that the
expert exploits by (ine¢ ciently) slowing down the training speed and keeping the novice
in her employment for longer.
Motivated by the experts preference for articially lengthy apprenticeships, as well as
by general commentary on real-world masters exploitingtheir apprentices via contracts
with slow training and low consumption (as discussed in Section 2), we consider two policy
experiments. First, we force the expert to pay the novice a minimum wage during training.
We show that while this policy leaves the contract length una¤ected (an implication of the
experts 1
e
rule), it raises surplus by uniformly accelerating the novicestraining and, with
it, his output. The reason for this e¢ ciency gain is that raising the novices productivity
allows the expert to partially o¤set the expense caused by the minimum wage. Second, we
force the expert to contain his interactions with the novice within a shorter horizon. The
result is also an e¢ ciency gain: the policy alters the experts optimal balance between
knowledge gifted and knowledge sold in favor of a larger gift and a faster sale. We end our
policy discussion by illustrating how both of these policies may backre when the expert
does not enjoy rents to begin with.
Finally, we consider several extensions of the model. First, the case in which the
novice has concave utility, giving him a preference for smooth consumption. In this case,
the expert grants the novice an increasing consumption path that is initially close to
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zero; representing a compromise between delaying consumption (which allows the expert
to more quickly extract output from the novice) and smoothing consumption (which
helps the novice endure the apprenticeship). Second, we consider brief straightforward
extensions of practical interest: the expert facing training costs, the novice arriving with
capital, and the case in which training causes externalities on the expert (such as an
expert partner in a law rm benetting when a novice associate becomes a more e¤ective
problem solver, e.g. Garicano 2000, or an expert rm losing prots when training a novice
rm who then becomes a more e¤ective competitor). All of these modications alter the
optimal contract exclusively via the ratio of knowledge gifted to sold. Finally, we show
that the set of Pareto-e¢ cient contracts is a family of apprenticeships in which training is
accelerated as the novices Pareto weight grows. Taken together, these extensions suggest
that the models core results are robust.
The human capital acquisition literature, since Beckers (1994[1964]) classic analysis,
shows that rms will in principle not pay for general human capital acquisition of their
workers if they were to do so, they would not recoup their investment, as workers can
always move to another rm. A large literature has aimed to explain, under these circum-
stances, rmsincentives to train their workers by relying on market imperfections. These
imperfections include: imperfect competition for workers (e.g. Stevens, 1994, Acemoglu,
1997, and Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a,b); asymmetric information about a workers
training (e.g. Katz and Ziderman, 1990, Chang and Wang, 1996, and Acemoglu and
Pischke, 1998); and matching frictions (Burdett and Smith, 1996, and Loewenstein and
Spletzer, 1998). In our analysis, in contrast, it is the timing of training, with gradual
training combined with promises of further training down the road, that supports the
knowledge transfer.1
A di¤erent literature studies the complementary problem of a rm that, to reward the
investments of its workers in specic human capital, attempts to build credible promises.
Prendergast (1993) argues that, when rms can commit to pay di¤erent wages across
tasks, the promise of promotions provides a solution. Relatedly, Kahn and Huberman
(1988) and Waldman (1990) argue that an up-or-out rule leads to credible promises, even
if the promoted worker has similar productivity in all jobs.
1Alternatively, in the learning-by-doing models (following, e.g., Heckman, 1971, Weiss, 1972, Rosen,
1972, Killingsworth, 1982, and Shaw, 1989) skill accumulation is a by-product of work. Unlike in these
models, our principal has the exibility to determine the rate at which learning takes place independently
of the amount of time the agent spends working.
5
Malcomson et al. (2003) study the training of workers using long-term apprenticeship
contracts with an initial period of low wages during which the training rm earns rents,
allowing it to recover its training costs. They study how asymmetric information, con-
cerning both the workers intrinsic ability and the rms training costs, which are absent
in our model, impact the workers training. In their model, all training occurs at the start
of the relationship, before the period of low wages is over.2 (In this setting, workers do not
leave before the low-wage period is over because their ability is not observed by competing
rms.) In our model, in contrast, the timing of training is endogenous, allowing us to
study how knowledge transfers are optimally spread out over time.
Our work is also related to the literature on principal-agent models with relational
contracts, in which, akin to our model, self-enforcing rewards motivate the agent (a few
examples of this growing literature are Bull, 1987, MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989, 1998,
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994, Levin, 2003, Rayo, 2007, Halac, 2012, Li and Ma-
touschek, 2013, Barron et al. 2015).3 This literature focuses on eliciting a costly, produc-
tive e¤ort from the agent while treating the agents skill level as stationary and exogenous.
In contrast, we treat the agents skill as persistent and endogenous while assuming away
e¤ort costs.4
Hörner and Skrzypacz (2010) study a separate challenge underlying knowledge trans-
fers: asymmetric information regarding the value of the knowledge to be sold. They show
that in an environment with limited enforceability, a privately-informed seller benets
from gradual revelation as a way to provide evidence regarding the quality of her infor-
mation, and therefore raise the price of the information yet to be sold.5 In our model, in
2In this setting, apprenticeships involve a commitment to future wages (which is not possible in our
model). The authors show that a regulator can promote training by subsidizing rms and simultaneously
forcing them to o¤er contracts with longer periods of low wages after training is over (which is possible
in their setting because of information asymmetries). In our setting, in contrast, a regulator can increase
surplus by forcing rms to limit their knowledge transfers to a shorter training horizon, a consideration
absent in Malcomson et al. (2003). In our setting, since training is gradual, a second policy a minimum
wage during training may also be benecial.
3In an alternative setting, Bar-Isaac and Ganuza (2008) study the e¤ect of training on e¤ort in the
presence of career concerns.
4Owing to the liquidity constraint faced by our novice, the dynamic enforcement constraint that
governs the provision of self-enforcing incentives takes a di¤erent form across the two settings: in the
costly-e¤ort setting, this constraint typically indicates that self-enforcing money bonuses cannot exceed
the (stationary) future surplus created by the relationship; in the knowledge-transfer setting, it indicates
that the money transfers that can be extracted from the novice cannot exceed the (shrinking) value of
the knowledge yet to be gained by the novice (which represents only a fraction of future surplus).
5Anton and Yao (2002) also consider the sale of information of unknown quality. In their model,
to signal quality, the seller reveals part of her information up front. After that, two rms compete to
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contrast, the value of information is known to all and gradual transmission is instead a
consequence of the buyer being liquidity-constrained i.e. requiring knowledge to produce
output and compensate the seller with it.
Finally, a related literature studies lender/borrower contracting under limited enforce-
ability (e.g. Thomas and Worrall, 1994, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004, DeMarzo
and Sannikov, 2006, Biais et al., 2007, and DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007). Limited en-
forceability means that the borrowers access to capital is restricted; therefore, his output
can grow at most gradually over time. In this lender/borrower setting, transactions in-
volve a single good (capital), whereas in our setting players trade knowledge for capital
(or, equivalently, for labor). As a result, the equilibrium contracts take a di¤erent form.
In the lender/borrower setting, absent uncertainty, players write debt contracts in which
debt payments are enforced via the threat of direct punishments on the borrower (i.e.
legal penalties and/or a reduction in the borrowers access to the productive technology).
In our setting, in contrast, after an initial knowledge gift rather than a loan players
engage in a sequence of spot sales contracts, and the reason they remain in the relation-
ship is to benet from future sales, rather than to avoid punishments.6 As Bulow and
Rogo¤ (1989) show, in the lender/borrower setting, self-enforcing debt contracts are only
possible when direct punishments are available (otherwise, the agent eventually prefers
to unilaterally reinvest his output rather than using it to honor his debt). In our setting,
with knowledge being noncontractable and general-purpose, such direct punishments are
absent and, yet, are not needed to sustain a productive relationship. Also novel to our
setting is the economic trade-o¤ at the heart of the model: the fraction of knowledge that
the expert sells, rather than gifts, to the novice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes stylized facts in
expert-novice relationships. Sections 3 and 4 present the baseline model and derive the
optimal contracts. Section 5 considers policy experiments and Section 6 considers various
extensions of the baseline model. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
purchase the remaining knowledge in a one-shot transaction.
6In both cases, provided he is risk-neutral, the agent postpones all consumption until after output has
reached its e¢ cient level. In the lender-borrower setting, foregoing consumption helps the agent more
quickly honor his debt; in our setting, it helps the agent more quickly purchase additional knowledge.
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2 Some stylized facts
Here we present some empirical observations, concerning knowledge transfers within and
between rms, that serve to motivate our analysis. These observations illustrate the
di¢ culties caused by a weak contracting environment and suggest that, often, the resulting
knowledge transfers are ine¢ ciently slow.
2.1 Apprenticeships, professional partnerships, and slow knowl-
edge transfers
It has long been observed that apprenticeships may be ine¢ ciently lengthy, and training
ine¢ ciently slow. According to Adam Smith, long apprenticeships are altogether un-
necessary... [If they were shorter, the] master, indeed, would be a loser. He would lose
all the wages of the apprentice, which he now saves, for seven years together (Smith,
1863:56). During the industrial revolution, in extreme cases, training would slow to a
crawl: [S]ome masters exploited these apprenticeshelpless situations, demanding vir-
tual slave labour, providing little in the way of food and clothing, and failing to teach the
novices the trade (Goloboy, 2008:3). Regarding musical trainees, McVeigh (2006:184)
notes: Since the master received any earnings from concert appearances, apprentices were
inevitably subject to exploitation [. . . ] Other apprentices he set to menial tasks. Burney
[the apprentice] recorded with irritation the drudgery he undertook for Arne [the master]
in the mid 1740s: Music copying, coaching singers and so on.
Similar observations are often made of present-day training relationships. According
to a UK government inquiry: Several apprentices reported that they were being used as
cheap labour [...] Typical responses from apprentices were that [...] they were used to
do menial tasks around the workplace(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills,
2013).7
An important instance of knowledge transfers occurs in professional service rms.
These rms provide a wide range of general skills to junior consultants, usually called
associates (see, for example, Maister, 1993, and Richter et al., 2008). Once again, training
appears to be slowed down, articially, while associates pay their dues.In the process,
7Apprentices Pay, Training and Working Hours. BIS, UK Government, 2013.
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/le/49987/bis-13-532-
follow-up-research-apprentices-pay-training-and-working-hours.pdf.)
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rents are extracted from their work in exchange for the promise of further training and
eventual promotion.8
At law rms, for example, the training of associates seems, anecdotally, to proceed at
a glacial pace; as a result, associates are forced into menial tasks. Numerous blog posts
and articles are dedicated to describing this feature. For instance, according to a former
litigator, this recession may be the thing that delivers them from more 3,000-hour years
of such drudgery as changing the dates on securitization documents and shu­ ing them
from one side of the desk to the other... it often takes a forced exit to break the leash
of inertia that collars so many smart law graduates to mind-numbing work(New York
Times, 2009).9 Similarly, as an Australian Justice observes, young solicitors are being
exploited and overworked by law rms that have lost sight of their traditional duty to
nurture the next generation of lawyers.10 Perhaps not surprisingly, the response of the
American Bar Association (ABA) is to tough it out. The ABA admonishes, in its advice
to young lawyers: No task is too menial that you cant learn from it.11
2.2 International joint ventures and limited contractability
International joint ventures between a northernrm in a developed country (the ex-
pert) and a southern rm in a developing country (the novice) frequently involve a
technology transfer in exchange for a cash ow. Often, owing to weak institutions in the
developing country, the partners cannot rely on legally-enforced contracts; as a result,
their relationship becomes analogous to one in which knowledge is transferred between
two individuals. In this case, the relationship only lasts for as long as the parties consider
it in their common interest to continue their knowledge-for-cashexchange.
A notable example is the failed partnership of Danone and Wahaha. Their relation-
ship began in 1996 when Danone, a French drink and yogurt producer, established a joint
venture with the Hangzhou Wahaha group, a Chinese producer of milk drinks for chil-
dren. (See, for example, Financial Times, April 2007.)12 For Danone, the venture was
a way to prot from the growing Chinese market; for Wahaha, it was a means to learn
8Levin and Tadelis (2005) provide an alternative view of partnerships. There, partnerships serve as a
commitment device to provide high-quality service in a context of imperfect observability.
9Another View: In Praise of Law Firm Layo¤s.NYT. Dealbook. July 1, 2009. By Dan Slater.
10http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-a¤airs/rms-exploiting-young-lawyers-says-chief-
justice-marilyn-warren/story-e6frg97x-1226717910085.
11http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialpractice/younglawyers.html.
12How Danones China venture turned sour.FT. April 11, 2007. By Geo¤ Dyer.
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Danones technology. Initially, the joint venture was highly successful, contributing 5-
6% of Danones entire operating prots. However, in 2007, after Wahaha learned what it
needed, it set up a parallel organization that served its clients outside of the joint venture.
Danone appeared, legally, to have the upper hand, as it owned 51% of the joint
venture. However, its power was not real. As noted by the press, the joint venture
depends on Mr. Zongs [Wahahas boss] continuing cooperation. Not only is he chairman
and general manager of the joint venture, but he is the driving force behind the entire
Wahaha organization. Furthermore, in China, employees in private enterprises often feel a
stronger loyalty to the boss than the organization itself. Winning in the courts or pushing
out Mr. Zong, therefore, are not solutions to Danones problems.(Financial Times, April
2007). Workers were strongly behind Zong: We formally warn Danone and the traitors
they hire, we will punish your sins. We only want Chairman Zong. Please get out of
Wahaha!(Financial Times, June 2007).13 In the end, Danone lost all its court battles
in China, and with them its trademarks.
The Danone-Wahaha case is far from unique; indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests
that these types of disputes are quite common. For example, in a case involving two
industrial machinery manufacturers, Ingersoll-Rand claimed that Liyang Zhengchang had
breached their joint-venture agreement by manufacturing and selling imitation processing
equipment based on Ingersoll-Rands patents.14 Once again, the Chinese authorities sided
with the Chinese partner.
In the previous examples, the northern partner appears to have underestimated the
weakness of the legal institutions in question; as a result, it failed to appreciate the
dynamic inconsistency of the exchange. A case in which the northern partner seems fully
aware of such challenges is the auto-manufacturing alliance between General Motors (GM)
and the Chinese manufacturer SAIC. As GMs chairman points out: We have a good
and viable relationship and partnership. But to make it work, you have to have needs
on both sides of the table (Wall Street Journal, 2012).15 GM was careful to provide
enough knowledge to make the relationship valuable for SAIC: SAIC [...] went into the
partnership with big dreams but little know-how. Today the companies operate much
more like equals.At the same time, presumably mindful of the self-enforcing nature of
13Still waters run deep in dispute at Wahaha.FT. June 12, 2007. By Geo¤ Dyer.
142000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18449.
15Balancing the Give and Take in GMs Chinese Partnership.WSJ. August 19, 2012. By Sharon
Terlep.
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the relationship, GM has not yet transferred some of its most valuable knowledge: GM
is holding tight to its more valuable technology. Beijing is eager to tap into foreign auto
companiesclean-energy technologies. But GM doesnt want to share all its research with
its Chinese partner. Indeed, SAIC could use GM expertise and technology to transform
itself into a global auto powerhouse that challenges the American car maker down the
road.
3 Baseline model
There are two risk-neutral players: an expert E (she) and a noviceN (he). Players interact
over innite periods t = 1; 2; ::: and discount future payo¤s using a common interest rate
r > 0: Let  = 1
1+r
denote the playersdiscount factor. The expert possesses one unit
of general-purpose knowledge. This knowledge is perfectly divisible, does not depreciate,
and can be transferred from the expert to the novice at any speed desired by the expert.
Let xt 2 [0; 1] denote the fraction of knowledge transferred during period t and let Xt
denote the novices total knowledge, inclusive of xt, during period t:
Xt = xt +Xt 1;
with X0 = 0.
During period t; the novice produces output f(Xt) 2 R+; with f continuous and
increasing, and f(0) = 0: One interpretation is that the novices output originates from
a variety of tasks, with less valuable tasks requiring less knowledge. In this case, as the
novice acquires knowledge, he e¢ ciently spends less time on menial tasks and more on
advanced ones.16 For the time being, to highlight the experts desire for an articially slow
knowledge transfer, we assume that the expert faces no costs when training the novice.17
Let P (X 0; X) = 1
1  [f(X
0)  f(X)] denote the marginal value of a package of knowledge
containing X 0  X units, in present discounted terms, starting from an initial knowledge
stock X:
16For example, a cook may either engage in the menial task of chopping vegetables or in the advanced
task of making sauces (e.g. Gergaud et al., 2014). Similarly, a consultant may either perform lengthy
spreadsheet calculations or simply advise others on what objects to calculate (e.g. Garicano, 2000). In
either case, only after appropriate training is the worker successful at the advanced task.
17This assumption rules out both direct training costs and externalities experienced by the expert as
the novice becomes more knowledgeable. In Section 6.2, we extend the model to illustrate the impact of
such costs.
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The novice has a bank account that pays interest r between periods. Let (1 + r)Bt 1
and Bt denote, respectively, the balance of this account at the beginning and end of period
t: The novice cannot borrow from his bank (Bt  0) and, for now, has no initial capital
(B0 = 0). The expert, in contrast, has deep pockets.
Each period t has three stages. First, there is a knowledge-transfer stage in which
players swap knowledge for cash: the expert makes a knowledge transfer xt and the novice
makes a money transfer mt 2 R in return. Players rely on a spot contract for this swap.
Each player i = E;N simultaneously proposes a pair (xit;m
i
t) subject to two feasibility
constraints: (1) xit is no larger than the experts remaining knowledge stock 1 Xt 1; (2)
mit is no larger than the novices current savings (1 + r)Bt 1. If (x
E
t ;m
E
t ) = (x
N
t ;m
N
t ) an
agreement is reached and the corresponding transfers take place: xt = xEt and mt = m
E
t .
Otherwise, no agreement is reached and xt = mt = 0:
Second, there is a production stage in which the novice either works on her own (dt = 0)
or works for the expert (dt = 1), and the expert pays a wage wt 2 R to the novice.
Players rely on a spot employment contract. Each player simultaneously proposes a pair
(dit; w
i
t) (with d
i
t 2 f0; 1g) subject to  wit not exceeding the novices current bank balance
( wit  (1 + r)Bt 1   mt). If (dEt ; wEt ) = (dNt ; wNt ) an agreement is reached: dt = dEt
and wt = wEt . Otherwise, dt = wt = 0: Since knowledge is general, output f(Xt) is
independent of the employment decision.
Third, there is a consumption stage in which the novice splits his stage-2 earnings
wt+(1  dt) f(Xt) and remaining balance (1+r)Bt 1 mt between consumption ct 2 R+
and savings. His resulting end-of-period balance is
Bt = wt + (1  dt) f(Xt) + (1 + r)Bt 1  mt   ct:
All variables are observed by both players. In addition, the only formal (court-
enforced) contracts that can be written are the one-period spot contracts described above.
All other agreements must be self-enforced.18
From the standpoint of the beginning of period t; the continuation payo¤s for expert
18If the expert had commitment power (e.g. owing to external reputation concerns), the assumption
that spot contracts are court-enforced would not be required.
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and novice are, respectively,
t =
1X
=t
 t [m + df(X )  w ] and
Vt =
1X
=t
 tc = (1 + r)Bt 1 +
1X
=t
 t [ m + (1  d ) f(X ) + w ] :
Since the playerscombined surplus is 1 +V1 =
P1
t=1 
t 1f(Xt); the rst-best allocation
calls for a full knowledge transfer in the rst period.
A self-enforcing relational contract (or more briey, a contract) prescribes, on the path
of play, a vector hXt;mt; dt; wt; cti for every period t; and, upon any deviation from that
prescription, it prescribes a suspension of all further transactions between the players.19
For notational simplicity we denote a contract by its prescribed actions on the path of
play: C = hXt;mt; dt; wt; cti1t=1. Let t(C); Vt(C); and Bt(C) denote, respectively, the
equilibrium values of t; Vt; and Bt: Also let 
 denote the set of contracts C that satisfy
the basic requirements that xt  1 Xt 1, Bt(C)  0, and ct  0 for all t. We say that a
contract C is feasible if it belongs to 
 and, in addition, it constitutes a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Feasibility of C requires that six constraints are met for every period tthree con-
straints for each of the rst two stages.20 As we show momentarily, however, all stage-2
constraints are redundant.
Stage-1 constraints
From the standpoint of the beginning of stage 1, both players must weakly prefer to
follow their prescribed actions over reneging on the agreement:
t(C)  0 for all t; (1)
Vt(C)  1
1   f(Xt 1)| {z }
value of knowledge
+ (1 + r)Bt 1(C)| {z }
current balance
for all t: (2)
19These trigger punishments are in principle not immune to renegotiation. As we shall see, however,
the optimal relational contract is itself immune to renegotiation.
20In principle we may also require a constraint for stage 3, in which the novice makes his consump-
tion/savings decision. This constraint, however, is redundant because, because being risk-neutral and
earning interest r; the novice can always replicate an over-consumptiondeviation in this stage with a
deviation in stage 1 of the following period in which he walks away with his savings.
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The novices constraints require that he weakly prefers his continuation payo¤ over walk-
ing away with his current stock of knowledge Xt 1 (worth 11 f(Xt 1) in present value)
together with his current cash balance. We call these two constraints the playersincentive
constraints.
In addition, the novice must have su¢ cient liquidity to a¤ord the transfers mt:
mt  (1 + r)Bt 1(C) for all t: (3)
Stage-2 constraints
From the standpoint of the beginning of stage 2, both players must again be deterred
from reneging on the agreement:
dtf(Xt)  wt| {z }
stage-2 revenues
+ t+1(C)  0 for all t; (4)
Vt(C)  1
1  f(Xt 1)| {z }
value of knowledge
+ (1 + r)Bt 1(C) mt| {z }
current balance
for all t: (5)
The novice must also be able to a¤ord the transfers  wt:
 wt  (1 + r)Bt 1(C) mt for all t: (6)
Lemma 1 tells us that, without loss, the residual claim of output can be granted to the
novice and wages can be set to zero. As a result, all stage-2 constraints are redundant:
Lemma 1 Let C = hXt;mt; dt; wt; cti1t=1 be a feasible contract. There exists a feasible
contract C 0 = hXt;m0t; d0t; w0t; cti1t=1 that prescribes the same knowledge transfers and equi-
librium payo¤s 1; V1 as contract C and under which, in every period, the novice is the
residual claimant of output (d0t = 0) and receives zero wages (w
0
t = 0). Moreover, under
contract C 0 all stage-2 constraints ((4), (5), and (6)) are redundant.
Intuitively, since knowledge is general, it is immaterial whether the residual claimant
of output is the novice or the expert. In the former case, the novices most tempting
deviation consists in walking away from the relationship during the knowledge-transfer
phase of a given period t, before making any money transfer to the expert. In the latter
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case, the novices most tempting deviation is identical except for the fact that it is initiated
during the production phase of period t 1; with the novice producing output f(Xt 1) on
his own rather than for the expert. In present-discounted terms, both deviations deliver
the same payo¤.
In what follows, we set dt = wt = 0 for all t and refer to a relational contract simply
as C = hXt;mt; cti1t=1 : We dene a training periodof C as a period in which the novice
receives knowledge (xt > 0) and the training phaseof C as the set of all its training
periods. We also let Xsup(C) = limt!1Xt denote the total knowledge transferred under
C.
4 Optimal contracts
An optimal contract solves the experts prot-maximization problem:
max
C2

1(C) (I)
s.t. (1); (2); and (3):
To build intuition, we begin with a simple benchmark in which, by assumption, all
transactions end after two periods. We then turn to contracts of optimal length. Through-
out, to avoid knife-edge cases in which there is more than one solution, we assume  is
genericin the sense that 1
1  6= n for all n 2 N:
4.1 Benchmark: two-period contracts
Here we consider contracts in which, by assumption, knowledge and money transfers are
restricted to occur in the rst two periods of the game (i.e. xt = mt = 0 for all t > 2).
The experts problem is
max
C2

m1 + m2
s.t. m1  0;
m2  min
8<: P (X2; X1)| {z }
Value of X2 X1
; (1 + r)B1(C)| {z }
Available cash
9=; ; (IC + L)
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Constraint (IC+L) tells us that m2 must be weakly below both the marginal value of the
knowledge transferred in the second period and the novices cash balance at beginning of
that period. A higher initial knowledge level X1 increases the novices subsequent liquidly,
but also reduces his willingness to pay for the remaining knowledge X2  X1, as there is
less of it. (In this two-period benchmark, the experts own incentive constraints (1) are
redundant.) The optimal contract belongs to a simple class:21
Remark 1 Any optimal two-period contract C = (Xt;mt; ct)t=1;2 consists of a knowledge
gift X1 > 0 and a money loan m1  0 in period 1 followed by a spot contract in period
2 in which the novice devotes the full balance of his bank account to purchase additional
knowledge X2  X1 > 0 at a price equal to marginal value P (X2; X1). Namely,
m2 = (1 + r)B1(C) = P (X2; X1):
When selecting the total knowledge transferX2 and the rst-period consumption level,
the experts only goal is to maximize the magnitude of the second-period knowledge sale.
For this reason, she opts for a full knowledge transfer (which maximizes the amount of
knowledge that is sold) and zero rst-period consumption (which maximizes the novices
purchasing power).
The initial knowledge gift and money loan must now solve:
max
X1>0;m10
m1 + P (1; X1)
s.t. P (1; X1) = (1 + r) [f(X1) m1] :
We learn that o¤ering a loan is counterproductive: while it increases the novices purchas-
ing power during the subsequent knowledge sale, it can only be recovered if the expert
simultaneously increases the price P (1; X1) by shrinking X1; which in turn hurts the
expert as the rst-period output is her only net source of revenues.
Finally, the optimal knowledge gift, obtained by setting P (1; X1) = (1 + r)f(X1);
satises
f(X1)
f(1)
= :
21An equivalent interpretation is that the principal sells X1 at an arbitrary price p > 0 to be paid in
period 2. Then, in period 2, the principal collects p and simultaneously sells X2   X1 at a discounted
price P (X2; X1) p: Such arrangement, however, is economically identical to that described in the remark
(in which p = 0).
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This gift is increasing in  and approaches 100% of knowledge as  approaches 1. The
reason is that as players become more patient, the present value of any incremental knowl-
edge grows without bound, which in turn allows the expert to extract all of the novices
rst-period output in exchange for an ever smaller second-period knowledge transfer. Note
also that the arrangement creates a deadweight loss equal to f(1)  f(X1) = (1  )f(1):
As  approaches 1; this loss vanishes.
As we shall see next, once the expert is free to select the overall length of the contract,
allowing her to capture output produced over multiple periods, she is in much less of a
rush to increase the novices productivity. As a result, she opts for lengthy contracts in
which the above comparative statics are overturned.
4.2 Optimal contracts of unrestricted length
Here we return to the general setting in which contracts are allowed to have an arbitrary
length. This setting allows for a rich set of contracts in which the expert may spread
knowledge gifts and sales over arbitrarily many periods and may also use monetary rewards
to keep the novice in the relationship. We begin by focusing on the relaxed problem in
which the experts incentive constraints are ignored:
max
C2

1(C) = maxC2

1X
t=1
t 1mt (II)
s.t. (2) and (3):
Lemma 2 rules out contracts of innite length in which training is carried out over
innitely many periods:
Lemma 2 Every contract C that solves the experts relaxed problem (II) has a nite
training phase, namely, Xt = Xsup(C) for some t.
Intuition is as follows. Consider a contract of innite length. From the standpoint of
any given date, the total (discounted) transfer that the expert can hope to extract from
the novice is no greater than the value of the knowledge yet to be transferred. Moreover,
since knowledge is nite, this value must necessarily approach zero as time goes by. As a
result, the expert can instead end the contract early by selling all remaining knowledge
at once, which the novice can eventually a¤ord, and benet from earlier revenues.
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We now dene a class of contracts, which we call delayed-rewardcontracts, and note
that the expert can restrict attention to this class.22
Denition 1 A nite contract C is a delayed-reward contract if it requires that 100%
of output produced before a given period T is transferred to the expert and, in return,
the expert grants the novice a one-time cash bonus M during period T , after which all
transactions end and the novice keeps 100% of output. The net money transfers under
such contract satisfy:
m1 = 0; mt = (1 + r) f (Xt 1) for t 2 f2; :::; T   1g ; and mT = (1 + r) f (XT 1) M:
In such arrangements, the novice is willing to endure the training phase, during which
he receives zero output, in exchange for both additional training and the eventual cash
bonus M: Since in the present baseline model the novice cares only about his total (dis-
counted) consumption and not its timing, these arrangements are e¢ cient and also max-
imize the novices incentives to remain in the relationship.
Remark 2 Let C 2 
 be a nite contract that satises constraints (2) and (3). There
exists a delayed-reward contract C 0 2 
 that satises both constraints and delivers the
same equilibrium payo¤s 1; V1 as contract C.
In a delayed-reward contract, the novices incentive constraint for period t < T takes
the following form:
(1 + r)
T 1X
=t
 tf(X )| {z }
Output surrendered to the expert

T 1X
=t
 tP (X+1; X ) + 
T tM| {z }
Future knowledge and bonus rewards
; (7)
which captures the fact that, knowledge being general, the novice is only willing to work
for the expert in exchange for future knowledge and money transfers, not for past ones.
In present discounted terms, the L.H.S. is the output the novice is asked to surrender
during the remaining periods of training and the R.H.S. is the benet the novice receives
22An economically equivalent arrangement is one in which the bonus M is paid over multiple periods
t  T (while keeping its present discounted value constant) rather than being concentrated on period T
alone. We also refer to such an arrangement as a delayed reward contract.
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in return, namely, the value of the knowledge XT   Xt he is yet to acquire, plus the
bonus.23
This constraint places an upper bound on the knowledge that the novice can be trusted
with at any point during training: a higher Xt means that the novice is asked to surrender
more output during training and, simultaneously, it lowers the value of the additional
knowledge he is o¤ered as compensation. It also shows that the expert can increase Xt;
and therefore the novices productivity, in three ways: a larger total knowledge transfer
XT ; a larger bonus, and an earlier graduation date.
Lemma 3 shows that every optimal delayed-reward contract prescribes a su¢ ciently
fast knowledge transfer so that, in any given period, the novice is able to produce no less
than the incremental value of the knowledge he acquires (in other words, the expert keeps
only the minimal amount of knowledge needed to prevent the novice from leaving):
Lemma 3 Suppose a delayed-reward contract C (prescribing a one-time bonus M during
period T ) solves problem (II). Then, C has the property that, in every period t > 1; the
novice pays a gross price no lower than the marginal value of the knowledge he acquires:
mt +M  1ft=Tg  P (Xt; Xt 1): (8)
This result tells us that the novice gains surplus, at most, at the very beginning of
the relationship (through a knowledge gift) and at the very end (through the bonus). In
every other period, the novice surrenders all his output in exchange for knowledge that
he values in no more than this output. Intuitively, if the expert is to gift any amount of
knowledge (for instance, by selling a fraction of knowledge at a price lower than marginal
value), it is most e¢ cient to concentrate this gift at the beginning of the relationship as
it allows the novice to raise his productivity sooner; and if the expert is to o¤er a money
bonus, for incentive reasons it is best to defer this bonus until all other transactions are
over. Note also that, when the novice is expecting a bonus, he may be willing to pay a
price larger than P (Xt; Xt 1) for the right to remain in the relationship.
23In the parlance of relational contracts, this incentive constraint represents a dynamic enforcement
constraint that indicates the extent to which future surplus can be recruited to enforce current money
transfers from the novice. In the present setting, only a fraction of future surplus (the fraction pocketed
by the novice) can be used for this purpose. In contrast, in the standard principal-agent setting, in
which both players have deep pockets and therefore surplus can be freely redistributed across them (e.g.
Levin, 2003), the playersentire continuation surplus can be recruited to enforce money transfers in any
direction.
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We now return to the experts original problem. Proposition 1 shows that the bonus
can be dispensed with and describes the overall structure of an optimal contract:
Proposition 1 In the baseline model, every optimal contract  solving problem (I) 
consists of a knowledge gift in period 1 followed by a sequence of spot sales contracts in
which the novice devotes all period t output (plus interest) to purchase knowledge Xt+1 Xt
in period t+1 at a price equal to marginal value P (Xt+1; Xt): This process continues until
100% of knowledge has been transferred, after which all transactions end.
An optimal contract is equivalent to an apprenticeship(work-for-training) arrange-
ment in which, until the knowledge transfer is complete, the novice works for the expert
and is compensated exclusively through additional knowledge. Specically, during each
period before the knowledge transfer is complete, the novice is asked to produce output
f(Xt) for the expert, rather than for himself; in return, at the beginning of the following
period, the novice is granted a package of knowledge [Xt; Xt+1] that has a (discounted)
value 
1 P (Xt+1; Xt) just high enough to o¤set this output loss. The overall length of
this apprenticeship is controlled by the size of the initial knowledge gift, with a smaller
gift leading to a more distant graduation.
Intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. First, recall that for a given total knowledge
transfer, the expert has two instruments for raising the novices productivity during train-
ing: a bonus and an earlier graduation date. Of the two, the bonus is a ner instrument
as, unlike an earlier graduation date, it allows the expert to raise output continuously.
However, since the incentive constraints (7) are linear in both output and the bonus,
whenever a bonus is used the expert adopts a corner solution in which the bonus is
raised to the point that output hits its upper bound f(1) during some period before the
contract is over. This large bonus can then be replaced, without loss, by a shorter con-
tract with the same output path but that allows the novice to graduate as soon as output
reaches f(1):24 Second, the price of knowledge is derived from Lemma 3: on the one hand,
any knowledge sold at a price lower than marginal value amounts to a fraction of knowl-
edge being gifted, but the novices productivity can be raised by speeding up all such
24The optimal output path can also be implemented with bonuses of varying size. Every such imple-
mentation calls for a bonus that is a multiple of the e¢ cient output f(1) (plus appropriate interest),
which results in the expert retaining the novice for a number of periods after the knowledge transfer
is complete. All such implementations, however, call for a net transfer of cash from the expert in the
last period of interaction, which is not feasible once the experts participation constraints are imposed.
Uniqueness of the optimal arrangement follows from this fact.
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gifts and concentrating them in the rst period of the relationship, before the knowledge
sale begins; on the other hand, once the bonus is set to zero, and given that the price
of knowledge never falls below marginal value, in no period is the novice willing to pay
more than marginal value. Finally, given that the expert captures all surplus during the
knowledge sale, she nds it optimal to sell all of her knowledge.
Before we further characterize the optimal contract, some remarks are in order:
 When selecting the optimal length of the apprenticeship, the expert faces the fol-
lowing trade-o¤: by raising the novices productivity, a larger knowledge gift allows
the expert to extract higher revenues during each training period; but since it also
reduces the amount of knowledge left for sale, it reduces the number of training
periods that the novice is willing to withstand. As we shall see, this trade-o¤,
which is central to the remainder of the paper, results in lengthy contracts in which
signicant output is wasted.
 The above apprenticeship calls for an extreme form of training in which the novice
is forced to consume zero until training is complete, at which point he graduates and
his consumption experiences a sudden increase. Below, we also consider less extreme
arrangements in which, owing to either government intervention or the novice being
risk averse, consumption is positive (though still low) during training.
 We have assumed that any deviation from a contracts prescriptions is punished
through permanent separation. Since separation typically results in a destruction
of output, it need not be immune to renegotiation. Fortunately, because of its
forward-looking nature, the above apprenticeship can be recast to avoid this pitfall,
as follows. After receiving the knowledge gift, the novice is invited, every period,
to purchase any amount of knowledge he desires at a price equal to the marginal
value P of the knowledge he wishes to acquire. Even if, in a given period, the
expert deviates by not selling knowledge under these terms, or the novice deviates
by failing to make such a purchase (or by devoting only part of his output to the
purchase), the players remain invited to meet again the following period, under the
same terms as before.
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4.3 Optimal contracts in closed form: a 1e rule
Here we derive the optimal knowledge gift and apprenticeship length. We begin by ex-
pressing the experts problem in reduced form, as a function of X1. The apprenticeships
overall length, denoted T (X1); is determined by the number of periods it takes for the
novice to a¤ord the remaining knowledge 1   X1 at a price equal to marginal value. A
consequence of knowledge being sold at this price, and the novice exhausting all his cash
holdings when paying such price, is that both output and the experts per-period revenues
grow at the interest rate r until training is complete.25 As a result, T (X1) 1 corresponds
to the number of periods of compound growth at this rate required for output to reach
f(1) starting from level f(X1); namely,
T (X1)  1 = 1jlog j log

f (1)
f (X1)

: (9)
Moreover, since the experts per-period revenues also experience compound growth at
rate r, the experts discounted revenue in period t  T (X1) is t 1mt = f(X1): Combining
these two observations, the experts reduced-form problem is
max
X10
[T (X1)  1]| {z }
# of transfer periods
 f(X1)| {z } :
discounted transfer per period
(10)
The objective captures the experts trade-o¤: a higher gift means that less knowledge is
left for sale and so the expert enjoys fewer periods of revenues (rst term), but it also
means that the remaining knowledge is sold more quickly and so the expert enjoys more
revenues during each spot transaction (second term). Proposition 2 describes the solution:
Proposition 2 Up to an integer constraint for an apprenticeships length, the optimal
knowledge gift X1 satises
f (X1)
f (1)
=
1
e
;
where e is Eulers number. As a result, the optimal apprenticeship has length T (X1) =
1
jlog j + 1; which is increasing in  and independent of the production technology.
This result tells us that no matter how patient players are, and regardless of the
details of f; the expert optimally balances her conicting goals by allowing the novice to
25Namely, mt = (1 + r)f(Xt 1) = P (Xt; Xt 1) implies (1 + r)f(Xt 1) = f(Xt) and (1 + r)mt = mt+1.
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produce, at the start of the apprenticeship, a share 1
e
of the e¢ cient output level. Indeed,
upon combining (9) and (10), the experts problem is equivalent to that of maximizing
the average logarithm log
h
f(1)
f(X1)
i

h
f(1)
f(X1)
i 1
of the output ratio f(1)
f(X1)
: The maximum is
achieved when this ratio is e:When each period consumes an arbitrarily small amount of
time (as formalized in Section 4.3.B below), this solution also has the property of equating
the present value of knowledge gifted (1
e
P (1; 0)) to the present value of knowledge sold
(
PT (X1)
t=2 
t 1P (Xt; Xt 1)). As a result, surplus is split 50-50 between the two players.
The present solution coincides with the solution to the secretary problemin which
a recruiter who faces a queue of job applicants of unknown quality must decide what
fraction of applicants to sample before making any hiring decision (e.g. Bruss, 1984).
As the total number of applicants tends to innity, the optimal sample converges to a
fraction 1
e
of all applicants (a result sometimes called a 1
e
law). While the two problems
have the same solution, they do not appear to have any direct economic link. In addition,
unlike in the secretary problem, we obtain a 1
e
rule for transactions of nite duration.26
Notice that the optimal apprenticeship is longer, and knowledge is transferred more
slowly, the more patient the players. Intuitively, when the interest rate r falls, knowledge
becomes more valuable, in the margin, to the novice (as he can use this knowledge during
every subsequent period of his life). As a result, a lower interest rate means that, each
period, the novice is willing to work for the expert in exchange for a smaller amount of new
knowledge. The expert takes advantage of this fact by stretching out the training phase
and keeping the novice with her longer. (Notice also the contrast with the two-period
contract derived in Section 4.1. There, the knowledge gift grows as r falls, and converges
to 100% of knowledge as r converges to 0.)
Consistent with real-world practices noted in Section 2, the experts 1
e
rule causes
lengthy apprenticeships. For instance, training takes approximately 9.5 years when the
annual interest rate is 10% and approximately 19.5 years when the interest rate is 5%.
This rule also means that the details of f do not a¤ect the length of the apprenticeship.
The implication is that, in the absence of other factors a¤ecting the relationship, novices
of di¤erent skill levels, and novices working on di¤erent tasks, take equally long to train.
Before turning to policy implications, we discuss the ine¢ ciencies caused by these long
training phases and well as the impact of increasing the playersfrequency of interaction
(while holding constant their underlying discount rate):
26We are grateful to Thomas Bruss for providing insights on the secretary problem.
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A. E¢ ciency and the role of 
Here we consider the deadweight loss associated to the optimal contract. Recall that
the contract is socially ine¢ cient as it articially spreads the knowledge transfer over
multiple periods. The resulting loss in surplus (namely, the present value of the loss in
output relative to rst best) is
jlog j 1X
t=1

t 1   1
e

f(1):
This loss increases with  for two reasons. First, a higher  leads to a longer training phase
and, with it, a slower knowledge transfer. Second, a higher  implies that the ine¢ ciencies
caused by the slower transfer loom larger from the perspective of period 1.
When measured as a fraction of rst-best surplus, P (1; 0), the loss is 1   1
e
  1 jln j 1e : In
contrast to the absolute loss, this relative loss falls with  because rst-best surplus grows
with  faster than the deadweight loss. However, as  converges to 1 this loss remains
bounded away from zero: it is no smaller than e 2
e
' 25% of rst-best surplus.
B. Frequency of interaction
Here we ask whether allowing players to interact with higher frequency (multiple times
during each date t) alters the length of the optimal apprenticeship, measured in calendar
time. One may wonder, for instance, if the apprenticeship consumes an arbitrary short
amount of time when players are allowed to interact arbitrarily often.27 We show that,
modulo the time it takes to exchange the initial knowledge gift (which is the length of time
consumed by stage 1 in a given period), the overall time consumed by the apprenticeship
is invariant in the frequency of interaction.
We assume that date t consumes one year and consists of n  1 periods. Accordingly,
 is the annual discount factor and 1=n the per-period factor. Denote a period by  and
let per-period output be f(X ; n), with f1 > 0, f2 < 0; and limn!1 n  f(1; n) < 1:28 A
given period  within date t consumes 1
n
years. Note that this setting is equivalent to the
baseline model with 1=n taking the place of  and f(X ; n) taking the place of f(Xt):
27We are grateful to Larry Samuelson for suggesting this problem.
28A special case of interest, with slight abuse of notation, is f(X ; n)  1nf(X ).
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From Proposition 2, the optimal knowledge gift X1 satises
f (X1; n)
f (1; n)
=
1
e
;
which in turn leads the apprenticeship to last N = 1jlog 1=nj + 1 periods. Accordingly, the
actual time T consumed by the apprenticeship, measured from the beginning of the rst
period to the end of stage 1 of the last period, is obtained by adding the time consumed
by the knowledge gift and the time consumed by the subsequent N 1 periods over which
the remaining knowledge is sold:
T =
1
n
[+N   1] = 
n|{z}
knowledge gift
+
1
jlog j| {z };
knowledge sale
where  2 [0; 1] is the fraction of time consumed by stage 1 alone in any given date.
Therefore, excluding the initial gift stage, the contracts duration is invariant in n.
Intuitively, the overall value of the knowledge 1 X1 sold, measured as a fraction of the
e¢ cient output f (1; n) ; depends only on the underlying discount factor  and not on the
frequency of interaction. As a result, the novice must spend an invariant amount of time
in training, working for expert, in order to a¤ord this knowledge.
5 Policy experiments
Governments are interested in encouraging rms to o¤er apprenticeships that grant sig-
nicant benets to apprentices. For instance, in a recent meeting in Guadalajara, Mex-
ico, the G20 ministers declared themselves committed to promote, and when necessary,
strengthen quality apprenticeship systems that ensure high level of instruction [...] and
avoid taking advantage of lower salaries(OECD, 2012).29 Given the di¢ culties we dis-
cussed in Section 2, good policy is crucial in this area. As the OECD put it, Quality
apprenticeships require good governance to prevent misuse as a form of cheap labour.30
29OECD note on quality apprenticeshipsfor the G20 task force on employment.September, 2012.
(http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/OECD%20Apprenticeship%20Note%2026%20Sept.pdf.)
30Governments have long been interested in regulating apprenticeships. See, for example, Malcomson
et al. (2003) for a discussion and Elbaum (1989) for a historical perspective. As noted in the introduction,
Malcomson et al. consider an example of regulation. There, rather than being forced to shorten their
training (which is one of the experiments we study here), rms are forced to pay low wages over a
minimum time period after training is over. The authors show that this seemingly counter-intuitive
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Motivated by such concerns, we consider two policy experiments: a minimum wage (or
minimum consumption level) during training and a limit on the contracts duration. The
discussion that follows presumes that the expert earns su¢ cient rents from the relationship
that she remains interested in training the novice even after the loss in prots caused by
these policies. If instead the expert earns no rents, the policies may easily backre, as
illustrated below.
Minimum wage. Suppose a planner requires that the expert pay the novice a wage of
at least wmin > 0 during each period of the relationship. In the present formulation of the
model, with the novice acting as the residual claimant of output, this policy is captured
by setting all wages to zero and instead requiring that the novice keeps at least wmin each
period for consumption namely, ct  wmin for all t  T .31 So that the expert is willing
to contract with the novice, we assume wmin < f(1).
Corollary 1 tells us that the optimal contract retains the basic properties of the ap-
prenticeship characterized in Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 Under a minimum wage policy, every optimal contract consists of a knowl-
edge gift in period 1 followed by a sequence of spot contracts in which the novice devotes
all period t output, minus the minimum wage, to purchase knowledge Xt+1 Xt in period
t+ 1 at a price equal to marginal value P (Xt+1; Xt): This process continues until 100% of
knowledge has been transferred.
As in the baseline model, the expert concentrates the knowledge gift in the rst period,
after which she extracts all of the novices surplus via prices equal to marginal value. The
di¤erence is that the novice must now split his output between consuming wmin and
purchasing new knowledge. Consequently, for any xed knowledge gift, the policy has
the e¤ect of reducing the magnitude of each spot transaction, which in turn slows down
the speed at which knowledge is transferred. As we shall see, this fact biases the experts
trade-o¤ (between the amount of knowledge sold and the speed of this sale) in favor of
a smaller overall sale: only by lowering the amount of knowledge sold can the expert
counteract the lower speed of sale caused by the minimum wage.
regulation may be benecial when information asymmetries prevent workers from leaving the rm, and
the rm is capable of committing to future wages.
31Since the novice is risk neutral, he is indi¤erent between literally consuming wmin in a given period
and saving this money for future consumption. We assume that the regulation forbids any such savings
from being transferred back to the expert.
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The corollary allows us to express the experts problem in reduced form, with X1
serving as her choice variable. Recall that in the baseline contract, after the initial gift,
output grows at rate r until training is complete. Under the present policy, it is net
output f(Xt)   wmin that grows at rate r:32 The length of the apprenticeship, which we
now denote T (X1; wmin); is in turn pinned down by the number of periods of compound
growth required for net output to reach its nal value f(1)  wmin.
Moreover, since the novices net output during training is transformed into revenues
for the expert, such revenues also grow at rate r: As a result, the experts discounted
revenues remain constant throughout the sales process: t 1mt = f(X1)   wmin: The
experts reduced problem becomes
max
X10
[T (X1; wmin)  1]| {z }
# of sales periods
 [f(X1)  wmin]| {z } :
discounted transfer per period
(11)
Proposition 3 describes the solution:
Proposition 3 Consider a minimum wage policy with wage wmin > 0. Up to an integer
constraint for an apprenticeships length, the optimal knowledge gift X1 satises
f (X1)  wmin
f (1)  wmin =
1
e
:
Consequently, the optimal apprenticeship has a length that is independent of wmin and,
during training, it prescribes an output path that is uniformly increasing in wmin:
This result tells us that the expert confronts the policy by transferring additional
knowledge to the novice while holding constant the length of the relationship. Specically,
up to the moment of graduation, the policy shifts the entire output path upward and, at
the same time, reduces its slope.33 The implication is that the policy is surplus enhancing.
Intuitively, transferring additional knowledge helps the expert partially o¤set the expense
caused by the minimum wage, which is attractive to the expert because it allows her to
32To see why, notice that the spot transaction in period t+ 1 satises,
(1 + r) [f(Xt)  wmin]| {z }
cash devoted to purchase
= P (Xt+1; Xt)| {z }
price of purchase
;
which upon rearranging terms delivers (1 + r) [f(Xt)  wmin] = f(Xt+1)  wmin:
33In addition, f (X1) converges to f(1); and the deadweight loss converges to zero, as wmin converges
to f(1).
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counteract the fact that the minimum wage, before the output path is adjusted, forces
the knowledge sale to slow down. The policy also increases the novices payo¤: it does
not a¤ect his graduation date (or the prize received upon graduation) and yet provides
him with positive consumption before that date.
That the length of the apprenticeship is invariant in wmin can be understood as follows.
Recall, from the baseline model, that the optimal balance between the experts conicting
goals (selling more knowledge vs. selling it faster) is achieved by selling knowledge over
1
jlog j periods, regardless of the details of f: Given that the minimum wage a¤ects the
experts per period revenues in an analogous way as constant drop in f; it also leaves the
contracts length una¤ected.
Limit on contract duration. An alternative intervention is a requirement that the
experts interactions with the novice end after some number Tmax of periods. When
binding, this requirement forces the expert to sell her knowledge faster and therefore to
sell less of it. The result is a higher knowledge gift and a uniformly higher level of output.
It is worth noting that the above policies might backre when the expert does not enjoy
rents to begin with. For a simple example, suppose two identical experts compete face to
face by simultaneously o¤ering contracts to a single novice, and suppose each expert must
pay a xed cost F > 0 whenever contracting for the rst time with the novice (regardless
of the novices level of knowledge).34 The equilibrium contract is an apprenticeship with
the properties in Proposition 1 and a duration that is just long enough for the expert in
question to recover F . If experts are required to pay a minimum wage, they must increase
the fraction of knowledge sold in order to recover this cost. The result is a loss of surplus
in the form of a lower knowledge gift and a uniformly lower level of output after that.
Even worse, if experts are required to reduce the contracts duration below its original
equilibrium level, it is impossible for them to recover the cost. As a result, they exit the
market.
6 Extensions
Here we extend the baseline model in several ways. First, we consider the case in which
the novice has concave utility. Second, we return to the baseline case and consider a few
34In a richer model, which we do not presently attempt, experts would face varying degrees of compe-
tition as well as other types of costs.
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simple modications of practical interest training costs, the novice arriving with capital,
and externalities on the expert all of which alter the length of the apprenticeship via the
ratio of knowledge gifted to sold. Finally, we describe the set of Pareto-e¢ cient contracts.
6.1 Consumption smoothing
Consider the case in which the novice derives instantaneous utility u(ct) from consumption.
The novices period-t continuation payo¤ is now
Vt(C) =
X
t
 tu (c ) ;
with associated budget constraint
P
t 
 tc = (1 + r)Bt 1 +
P
t 
 t [f(X ) m ] :
We assume a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES), namely, u (c) =
c1 
1  for some  > 0: This restriction makes it possible to derive a partial analytical
characterization of the optimal contract, which we then supplement with a numerical
solution. (A degree of consumption smoothing also arises if the novice requires a minimum
subsistencelevel of consumption cmin > 0 each period. In this case, the optimal contract
is the same as under a minimum wage policy see Section 5 for the case in which, beyond
the subsistence level, utility is linear and see below for the case in which, beyond this
level, utility is CIES.) To simplify notation, denote period-t output by yt = f(Xt) and let
y = f(1):
The only constraints that di¤er relative to the baseline model are the novices incentive
constraints. These constraints are derived as follows. Since the novice has a preference for
smooth consumption, her most tempting deviations arise after output yt is produced but
before consumption takes place (namely, at the beginning of stage 3 of the model). In such
a deviation, the novice walks away from the expert and perfectly smooths consumption
by setting c = yt + bt for all   t; where bt is the interest on the novices current cash
balance. As a result, the new incentive constraints are 1
1 u (yt + bt)  Vt(C) for all t:
As in the baseline model, the expert may restrict attention to contracts in which, at
the beginning of each period, the novice transfers all his available cash to the expert in
exchange for additional knowledge. In addition, the expert promises the novice a con-
sumption prole during training c1; :::; cT (C) 1; where T (C) is the contracts nal training
period, together with the graduation prize ct = f(1) for all t  T (C).35 The experts
35The expert may in principle also promise the novice a bonus M after training is complete. As in the
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problem is therefore
max
C2

T (C) 1X
t=1
t 1 [yt   ct]
s:t:
1
1  u (yt)  Vt(C) for all t < T (C) and VT (C)(C) =
1
1  u(y).
Proposition 4 links the novices optimal consumption and output proles:
Proposition 4 When the novice has concave utility u (c) = c
1 
1  ( > 0); an optimal
contract C prescribes, during training, the increasing consumption path
ct = (1  ) 1Yt for all t < T (C);
where Yt =
 P
t y


 1
 :
During each training period before the knowledge transfer is complete, the novice is
asked to sacrice utility u(yt) u(ct). As compensation, at the beginning of the following
period, the novice is granted a package of knowledge [Xt; Xt+1] with a (discounted) value

1  [u(yt+1)  u(yt)] just high enough to o¤set this utility loss. An increasing consumption
path represents a compromise between delaying consumption (which has the benet of
increasing the fraction of output that the novice devotes to buying further knowledge)
and smoothing consumption (which helps the novice endure the training phase). Since
knowledge purchases are most critical early on (as they expand output in every subsequent
period), the consumption path is skewed toward the future. As an example, in the case of
log utility ( = 1), Yt is the cumulative output produced up to period t and the resulting
output path is both increasing and convex.
We derive the remaining details of the arrangement numerically.36 The results, which
we illustrate in Figure 1 (at the end of this document), are as follows:
1. As the novices elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1

falls, he consumes a higher
fraction of output during training. Consequently, the overall knowledge sale slows
baseline model, however, this bonus can be dispensed with by instead promising the novice an earlier
graduation date.
36For any given contract length T; the prole (ct; yt)
T 1
t=1 solves 2(T  1) equations: ct = (1  )
1
 Yt and
u(yt)  u(ct) = 1  [u(yt+1)  u(yt)] for all t < T: The optimal contract is then obtained by optimizing
over T:
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down and the apprenticeship becomes lengthier and is always lengthier than in
the baseline model (Figure 1.A).
2. As in the baseline model, when players become more patient training is slowed down
and output is uniformly reduced. The reason is that, when  grows, knowledge
becomes more valuable, leading the expert to take longer to sell it (Figure 1.B).
3. Also as in the baseline model, imposing a minimum wage increases surplus by uni-
formly increasing output. The reason is that the expert partially counteracts the
expense caused by the minimum wage by transferring additional knowledge espe-
cially early in the relationship, when the minimum wage binds (Figure 1.C).37
6.2 Other motives for altering the apprenticeship length
The baseline model can be readily extended in several other ways. Here we describe some
examples. In all of them, the optimal contracts are apprenticeships with the properties
in Proposition 1.38 As a result, the modications that follow alter only the length of the
apprenticeship via the fraction of knowledge that is gifted rather than sold.
Training costs. Up to now, in order to emphasize the experts desire for slow training,
we have assumed that knowledge transfers are free. When training costs are introduced,
training may further slow down. As an example, suppose that raising the novices knowl-
edge fromX to X 0 costs the expert P (X 0; X) (namely, a fraction of the marginal value of
X 0 X) for some constant  2 (0; 1): (Equivalently, the cost could be a constant fraction
of the incremental output f(X 0)   f(X).)39 Once this cost is considered, the optimal
knowledge gift satises
f(X1)
f(1)
=
1
e1+A
;
where A = 
1 
jln j
1  (this constant is approximately equal to

1  when  is close to 1). As
one might expect, a higher cost results in a smaller gift and a longer training phase.
37In contrast to an increase in ; the policy has a pronounced impact on output early in the relationship.
Consequently, the overall training phase is (slightly) reduced despite the fact that the policy uniformly
raises consumption.
38The proof of this claim is a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 1. From brevity, we
leave this proof to the reader. (It is also available upon request.)
39As a function of X1, the experts payo¤ is [T (X1)  1] (1  )f(X1)   P (X1; 0), which shows that
the transmission cost reduces the net per-period revenues from the second period onwards (rst term)
and also makes the gift itself costly (second term).
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Novices liquidity. In the baseline model, the novice has no capital to begin with.
Suppose instead that the novice arrives with capital L > 0: Suppose also that L does not
exceed the value of all knowledge P (1; 0) otherwise, the expert would simply sell all
knowledge in the rst period and keep all surplus to herself. In an optimal arrangement,
the expert asks the novice to surrender all capital up front and, in return, o¤ers the novice
an apprenticeship that is worth, in present discounted terms, no less than L:40 Since an
apprenticeship with knowledge gift X1 is worth P (X1; 0) to the novice, the expert faces
the new participation constraint L  P (X1; 0). The optimal value of X1 is obtained
by maximizing the experts revenues during training, above and beyond L, subject to
this new constraint. The result is that the novices access to capital weakly accelerates
training while also weakly decreasing the novices rents. In fact, when L is insu¢ cient to
cover the value of the baseline knowledge gift (L < 1
e
P (1; 0)) the expert merely extracts
the novices capital without altering any other feature of the apprenticeship. Otherwise,
X1 satises L = P (X1; 0); which tells us that a more liquid novice is trained faster, but
obtains zero rents.
Externalities. In practice, the expert may experience externalities as the novice gains
knowledge. For example, a partner in a law rm benets when an associate becomes a
more e¤ective helper (e.g. Garicano, 2000). Alternatively, a northern rm loses prof-
its when a southern rm learns from it and becomes a stronger competitor (as might
potentially occur in the GM-SAIC case discussed in Section 2). For a simple formaliza-
tion, suppose that, in addition to collecting revenues from the novice, the expert herself
produces f(Xt) each period, with  >  1 capturing the magnitude and sign of the
externality.41 In this case, the optimal knowledge gift satises
f(X1)
f(1)
=
1
e
   (1+)(1 ) ;
which, as expected, is increasing in : a larger externality accelerates training. When  is
su¢ ciently large, training ends in one period; when  approaches  1; training is stretched
to innity.
40As shown in Section 6.3, using an apprenticeship with the properties in Proposition 1 guarantees that
the knowledge transfer is structured e¢ ciently.
41As a function of X1, the experts payo¤ is [T (X1)  1] (1 + )f(X1) + [T (X1) 1]P (1; 0); which
captures the impact of the externality during training (embedded in the rst term) and during every
period after that (second term).
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6.3 Pareto-optimal contracts
Here we characterize the broader class of Pareto-e¢ cient contracts that maximize a
weighted average of the players payo¤s. The exercise captures, in reduced form, in-
stances in which the novice has bargaining power ex-ante  for example, owing to the
existence of alternative occupations or alternative experts. (This simple setting does not
capture the potential impact of a competing expert who might attempt to poach the
novice while he is still being trained. We leave this possibility to future work.) Letting
 2 (0; 1) be the novices Pareto weight, an e¢ cient contract solves42
max
C2

V1(C) + (1  )1(C) (III)
s:t: (1); (2); and (3):
Corollary 2 shows that the family of e¢ cient contracts is a family of apprenticeships.
The length of these apprenticeships ranges from the baseline level 1jlog j   1 to a single
period, depending on the novices bargaining power:43
Corollary 2 Every e¢ cient contract solving problem (III) satises the properties in
Proposition 1 and prescribes a knowledge gift such that
f(X1)
f(1)
=
1
e
min
n
 

(1 )(1 ) ; e
o
:
This gift is increasing in the novices Pareto weight  up to the point in which all knowledge
is gifted.
The above contracts have the property that all surplus that is granted to the novice
is granted exclusively through a knowledge gift, rather than consumption, and this gift is
concentrated in the rst period. The expert, for instance, never o¤ers the novice a discount
during the spot knowledge sales. This feature is shared by every e¢ cient contract because
it guarantees that the novices productivity is raised as early as possible.44
42To avoid knife-edge cases in which problem (III) has multiple solutions, we assume that  and  are
genericin the sense that 1 21  6= n for all n 2 N:
43When  > 12 all knowledge is transferred in period 1. In addition, since players are risk neutral,
problem (III) calls for an unbounded money transfer from expert to novice.
44The Pareto frontier is given by the equation V1(1) =   1W ( z) ; where z = 1jln jf(1) 2 [0; 1e ] and W ()
is the Lambert W (or Product Log) function. When players interact innitely often, the allocation of
surplus ranges from a 50-50 split (when  = 0) to all surplus going to the agent (when   12 ).
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7 Conclusion
We study how to structure the dynamic relationship between an expert and a novice to
accomplish knowledge transfers under limited enforceability. The optimal contract takes
the form of an apprenticeship in which labor is traded for knowledge. At the start of
the relationship, the novice is trained just enough to produce a fraction 1
e
of the e¢ cient
output; after that, and until training is complete, the novice uses all of his output to
gradually pay for additional knowledge. In this arrangement, it is the promise of future
knowledge sales that induces players to remain in the relationship.
Since the expert has a motive to keep knowledge in reserve, to retain the novice, she
articially delays the knowledge transfer, leading in turn to an ine¢ ciently low level of
output. (When the agent is risk averse, output is split between knowledge purchases and
consumption, and the knowledge transfer further slows down.) A likely instance of this
ine¢ ciency can be found in careers within professional services. It appears, anecdotally,
that juniors spend years paying their duesto the rmspartners. During those years,
juniors are involved in menial work, rather than being more quickly trained to perform
high-value tasks.
We nd that, as players become more patient, training takes longer to complete and
output falls uniformly. The reason is that, as patience increases, the expert can keep the
novice around with smaller knowledge transfers, which are now more valuable, as compen-
sation. Thus, features that are traditionally considered to a¤ect the discount factor, such
as having more reliable partners, lead to slower transfers and lower productivity during
training.
We also nd that, provided the expert enjoys su¢ cient rents, simple policy interven-
tions are surplus enhancing. In particular, both minimum wages for the apprentice and
exogenous limits on the apprenticeships length, accelerate training and therefore raise
surplus. In both cases, to partially counteract the cost caused by the policy, the expert
uniformly raises the novices productivity throughout the apprenticeship.
Beyond apprenticeships, our model has implications for knowledge transfers in inter-
national alliances and joint ventures. The imperfect contractability in many developing
countries, resulting from weak institutions, means that contracts between companies may
exhibit the same lack of commitment that is characteristic of training relationships be-
tween individuals. As a result, the expertpartner transferring knowledge may benet
from slowing down the rate of transfer to ensure incentive compatibility while extracting
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maximum rents.
The model is highly tractable and can be used as a building block for other models in
which human capital acquisition is relevant. In future work, we expect to study training
hierarchies, where an expert can train a number of other agents who in turn can train
others. Also of interest would be to study, in the context of knowledge transfers between
rms, how other dimensions of the rmsinteraction can be used to strengthen their rela-
tionship, and therefore accelerate training. An example is the use of cross-share holdings,
typical, for instance, of Japanese Keiretsus.
Finally, the empirical evidence we have mentioned is, by necessity, anecdotal. Future
empirical work is needed to study the extent to which training is ine¢ ciently lengthy and
whether, as we suggest, patience slows down the rate at which knowledge is transferred.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let C 0 = hxt;m0t; d0t; w0t; cti1t=1 be such that, for all t; d0t = w0t = 0
and
m0t = mt + (1 + r) max fdt 1f(Xt 1)  wt 1; 0g+ min fdtf(Xt)  wt; 0g ;
where d0 = w0 = X0 = 0:45 By construction, C 0 and C prescribe the same knowledge
transfers and overall payo¤s 1 and V1. Moreover, for all t;
t(C 0) = t(C) + (1 + r) max fdt 1f(Xt 1)  wt 1; 0g  t(C);
Vt(C 0) =
1X
=t
 tct = Vt(C); and Bt(C 0) = Bt(C) + max fdtf(Xt)  wt; 0g :
We now show that C 0 satises the stage-1 constraints (1), (2), and (3). Constraint
(1) is met because t(C 0)  t(C) for all t: Constraint (3) is met because, for all t;
mt  (1 + r)Bt 1(C) implies
m0t  (1 + r)Bt 1(C) + (1 + r) max fdt 1f(Xt 1)  wt 1; 0g+ min fdtf(Xt)  wt; 0g ;
which in no greater than (1 + r)Bt 1(C 0): Constraint (2) is met because, for all t; either
dt 1f(Xt 1)  wt 1  0 and therefore the fact that C satises (2) in period t implies
Vt(C)  1
1  f(Xt 1) +
1

Bt 1(C) = 1
1   f(Xt 1) +
1

Bt 1(C 0);
or dt 1f(Xt 1) wt 1 > 0 and therefore the fact that C satises (5) in period t 1 implies
ct 1 + Vt(C)| {z }
Vt 1(C)
 1
1   f(Xt 1) + (1 + r)Bt 2(C) mt 1
which is equivalent to Vt(C)  11 f(Xt 1) + (1 + r)Bt 1(C 0):
Finally, we show that the stage-2 constraints (4), (5), and (6) are redundant. Con-
straint (4) is redundant because, given that d0t = w
0
t = 0 for all t; it is implied by constraint
45Namely, if in stage 2 the principal receives positive revenues (dtf(Xt) wt > 0), add these revenues,
with interest, to m0t+1; if in stage 2 the principal receives negative revenues (dtf(Xt) wt < 0), subtract
these revenues from m0t: As a result, both contracts give the expert the same total revenues in present
discounted terms.
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(1). Constraint (6) is redundant because, given that w0t = 0 for all t; it is implied by con-
straint (3). Constraint (5) is redundant because constraint (2) for period t+ 1 implies
Vt+1(C 0) = Vt(C 0)  ct  
1   f(Xt) +Bt(C
0);
which in turn implies Vt(C 0)  11 f(Xt) + (1 + r)Bt 1(C 0) mt; as desired.
Proof of Remark 1. That X1 > 0 and X2   X1 > 0 follows from the fact that
both inequalities are necessary for the expert to make positive prots. We now show that
(1 + r)B1(C) = P (X2; X1): If (1 + r)B1(C) > P (X2; X1); the expert can relax (IC+L) by
reducingX1 by a small amount such that (1+r)B1(C) remains above P (X2; X1); if instead
(1 + r)B1(C) < P (X2; X1); the expert can relax (IC + L) by increasing X1 by a small
amount such that (1 + r)B1(C) remains below P (X2; X1): Finally, that X1 is transferred
for free follows noting that the only positive money transfer from expert to novice, m2, is
fully devoted to purchasing knowledge X2  X1 rather than being used to pay for X1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose toward a contradiction that contract C = hXt;mt; cti1t=1
solves problem (II) and yet has an innite training phase i.e. Xt < Xsup(C) for all t.
The novices incentive constraints (2) require that, for all t;
1
1   f (Xt 1) + (1 + r)Bt 1(C)  Vt(C) = (1 + r)Bt 1(C) +
1X
=t
 t [f(X ) m ]
and therefore 1X
=t
 tm 
1X
=t
 t [f(X )  f (Xt 1)] : (12)
Now select a distant enough period k such that (1 + r)f (Xk 1)  P (Xsup(C); Xk 1)
(which exists because Xk 1 must converge to Xsup(C) as k grows) and consider a new
contract C 0 = hX 0t;m0t; c0ti1t=1 that is identical to C except for the following variables (in
words, C 0 asks the novice to save all period k 1 output and use these savings to purchase
at once, in period k; all knowledge Xsup(C) Xk 1 that was eventually to be transferred):
1. X 0t = Xsup(C) for all t  k.
2. c0k = 0 and c
0
t = f (Xsup(C)) + (1  ) [(1 + r) f (Xk 1) m0k] for all t > k (i.e. C 0
fully smooths consumption from period k onward).
3. m0k =
P1
=k 
 km +
P1
=k 
 k [f (Xsup(C))  f(X )] (i.e. in period k; the novice
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is asked to pay a sum equal to all future discounted transfers in the original contract,
plus the present discounted value of the additional knowledge he receives in the new
contract) and m0t = 0 for all t > k:
We now show that C 0 meets all constraints. On the one hand, inequality (12) implies
that
m0k 
1X
=k
 k [f(X )  f (Xt 1)] +
1X
=k
 k [f (Xsup(C))  f(X )] = P (Xsup(C); Xk 1) ;
which in turn implies that m0k  (1+ r)f (Xk 1) and therefore all liquidity constraints (3)
are met.
On the other hand, from the denition ofm0k we obtain  m0k+
P1
=k 
 kf (Xsup(C)) =P1
=k 
 k [ m + f(X )], which implies that
Vk(C 0) = (1+r)[Bk 2(C) + f (Xk 1)]| {z }
Bk 1(C0)
 m0k+
1X
=k
 kf (Xsup(C)) = Vk(C)+(1+r)ck 1  Vk(C);
and that, for all t < k;
Vt(C 0) = (1+r)Bt 1(C)+
k 1X
=t
 t [f(X ) m ]+k t
" 1X
=k
 kf (Xsup(C)) m0k
#
= Vt(C);
Consequently, the incentive constraints (2) are met for all t  k: Moreover, since there
are no transactions after period k; all remaining incentive constraints are met as well.
Note, nally, that C 0 delivers a strictly higher payo¤than C (i.e. 1(C 0) =
Pk 1
=1 
 1m
+ m0k <
Pk 1
=1 
 1m +
P1
=t 
 tm = 1(C 0)), a contradiction.
Proof of Remark 2. Let C = hXt;mt; cti1t=1 2 
 be an arbitrary nite contract, with
nal training period T; satisfying constraints (2) and (3). Select a bonus M , to be paid
in period T; such that
M =
T 1X
t=1
(1 + r)T t [f(Xt) mt] 
1X
t=T
t Tmt
(where the R.H.S. equals all output produced before period T net of all original money
transfers, expressed in period T dollars) and let contract C 0 = hXt;m0t; c0ti1t=1 satisfy:
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1. c0t = 0 for all t < T and c
0
t = f(XT ) + (1  )M for all t  T (i.e. C 0 fully smooths
consumption from period k onward):
2. m0t = (1 + r) f (Xt 1) for all t = 2; :::; T   1; m0t = (1 + r) f (Xt 1)  M for t = T;
and m0t = 0 for all other t:
Notice that C 0 is a delayed-reward contract (and C 0 2 
). Moreover, from the deni-
tions of m0t and M ,
1X
t=1
t 1m0t =
T 1X
t=1
t 1f (Xt)  T 1M =
1X
t=1
t 1mt;
and so both contracts prescribe the same total money transfers in present value.
That C and C 0 deliver the same payo¤s 1; V1 follows from the above observation
combined with the fact that both contracts prescribe the same output levels. That C 0
satises the liquidity constraints (3) follows directly from the denitions of c0t and m
0
t.
Finally, that C 0 satises the incentive constraints (2) follows from the fact that Vt(C 0) 
Vt(C) for all t  T (which in turn follows from the fact that c0t = 0 for all t < T ) and the
fact that all incentive constraints after period T are trivially met.
Proof of Lemma 3. Being a delayed-reward contract, C has the property that, for all
t  T;
Vt(C) = T tVT (C) = T t

1
1  f (XT ) +M

: (13)
We now argue that, being a solution to (II), C has the property that in every period
t > 1 in which knowledge is transferred (Xt 1 < Xt), the novices incentive constraint
holds with equality:
1
1  f (Xt 1) + (1 + r)f (Xt 1)| {z }
Bt 1(C)
= T tVT (C): (14)
If instead the period-t constraint was met with strict inequality, the expert could raise
Xt 1 by a small amount while still satisfying the constraint (together with the requirement
that Xt 1  Xt), allowing the novice to produce additional output in period t  1: Since
mt = (1 + r)f (Xt 1), this additional output would raise the experts revenue during t;
contradicting the optimality of C: (Notice that this change leaves all remaining incentive
constraints una¤ected because the novices continuation values Vt(C) depend only on XT
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and M .)
We are now ready to show that, for any given t > 1; inequality (8) holds:
First, assume that Xt 1 = Xt: It follows that the R.H.S. of (8) is P (Xt; Xt 1) = 0 and
the L.H.S. is either mt + M  1 ft = Tg = (1 + r)f(Xt 1)  0 (if t  T ) or mt = 0 (if
t > T ), as desired.
Second, assume that Xt 1 < Xt and further assume, toward a contradiction, that
inequality (8) fails. Suppose initially that t < T . Combining the incentive constraint for
period t with eq. (13) we obtain 1
1 f (Xt)  T tVT (C). In addition, since (8) fails we
must have (1 + r)f (Xt 1) < f (Xt) : From these two inequalities we obtain
1
(1  )f (Xt 1) <
1
(1  )f (Xt)  
T tVT (C);
which contradicts eq. (14). Suppose nally that t = T: Since mT = (1 + r) f (XT 1) M;
inequality mT +M < P (XT ; XT 1) is equivalent to
1
(1  )f (XT 1) <
1
1   f (XT )  VT (C);
which again contradicts eq. (14).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let D be the set of delayed-reward contracts. We proceed
in two steps. First, we show that every optimal contract in D has the features in the
proposition. Second, we show that no contract outside D is optimal.
Step 1. Consider an arbitrary contract C 2 D (with bonusM and nal period T ) that
solves the relaxed problem (II). From the proof of Lemma 3, eq. (14), in every period
t+ 1 such that Xt < Xt+1 we have
f (Xt) = (1  )T tVT (C): (15)
We now claim that
f(Xt) = min

(1  )T tVT (C); f(XT )
	
for all t < T: (16)
We prove this claim by induction. That the claim is true for t = T   1 follows from
noting that the novices incentive constraint for period T   1 requires that f(XT 1) 
(1   )VT (C); and whenever f(XT 1) < f(XT ) this constraint holds with equality (eq.
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(15)). Now suppose the claim holds for t = T   n (n 2 N). That the claim holds for
t = T   (n + 1) follows from noting that the novices incentive constraint for period
t requires that f(Xt)  (1   )T tVT (C); and whenever f(Xt) < f(XT ) we also have
f(Xt) < f(Xt+1) (since, by hypothesis, f(Xt+1) = min
n
(1  )T (t+1)VT (C); f(XT )
o
)
and therefore the constraint must again hold with equality (eq. (15)).
From (16), and the fact that C 2 D, we obtain
1(C) =
T 1X
t=1
t 1 min

(1  )T tVT (C); f(XT )
	| {z }
t 1f(Xt)
  T 1M; (17)
where VT (C) = 11 f (XT ) + M . The optimality of C requires that the above payo¤ is
maximized w.r.t. XT and M , subject to XT  1 and M  0: It follows that XT = 1:
We now observe that if M > (1 + r)f(1) there exists an alternative contract C 0 =
hXt;m0t; cti1t=1 in D that also solves problem (II) and that prescribes, in period T   1; a
bonus M 0 =  [M   (1 + r)f(1)] : Contract C 0 is identical to C except for the lower bonus
and the fact that it ends one period sooner: m0T = 0 and m
0
T 1 = (1 + r)f(Xt 1)  M 0:
Notice also that T tVT (C) = T 1 tVT 1(C 0) and thatM > (1+r)f(1) implies f(XT 1) =
f(1): Therefore, after manipulation of (17), we obtain:
1(C) =
T 1X
t=1
t 1 min

(1  )T tVT (C); f(1)
	  T 1M
=
T 2X
t=1
t 1 min

(1  )T 1 tVT 1; f(1)
	  T 2M 0 = 1(C 0):
In addition, we observe that M  (1 + r)f(1) if and only if mT  0; which follows from
combining the denition of mT (namely, mT = (1 + r)f(XT 1)  M) with the fact that
f(XT 1) = min f(1  )VT (C); f(1)g.
Consider now the experts original problem (I) in which the experts incentive con-
straints (1) are included. For contracts in D this constraint imposes the single additional
restriction that mT  0 (otherwise the expert would walk away before paying  mT ),
which, as noted, is equivalentM  (1 + r)f(1): It follows from the rst observation in the
previous paragraph that problems (I) and (II) have the same value (asM can be repeatedly
reduced without lowering the experts payo¤). In addition, from eq. (17), any contract
C 2 D that solves problem (I) (for whichM  (1+r)f(1) and so (1 )T tVT (C)  f(1)
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for all t < T ) delivers payo¤
1(C) = (T   1)T 1 [f(1) + (1  )M ]  T 1M:
Since this payo¤ is linear in M; and  takes a generic value (namely, (1  )(T   1) 6= 1),
it follows that M is either equal to zero (its lowest possible value) or equal to (1 + r)f(1)
(its highest possible one).
Finally, suppose contract C 2 D solves problem (I). If M = 0; the prices stated in the
proposition are obtained by noting, from eq. (16), that f(Xt) = f(Xt+1); and therefore
mt+1 = (1 + r)f(Xt) = P (Xt+1; Xt); for all t < T . If instead M = (1 + r)f(1); in the
last period of C no training takes place (as f(XT 1) = (1   )VT (C) = f(1)) and the
net money transfer is zero (as mT = (1 + r)f(1)  M = 0). As a result, this contract is
identical to a contract with M = 0; the same output and money transfers for t < T , and
that ends in period T   1.
Step 2. Consider a contract C =2 D and assume toward a contradiction that C solves the
original problem (I). From the proof of Remark 2, there is a contract C 0 2 D that solves the
relaxed problem (II) (as problems (I) and (II) have the same value) and that prescribes the
same output levels as C. Given the output levels prescribed by these two contracts, during
the training phase C 0 simultaneously maximizes each of the novices continuation payo¤s
Vt (because consumption is delayed) and minimizes each of the novices cash balances
(1 + r)Bt 1 (because no savings beyond a single period are allowed). Moreover, since
C does not share this feature, it follows that under C 0 the novices incentive constraint
is slack during at least one period t  T . Consequently, C 0 fails to satisfy eq. (16), a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. By substituting for the value of T (X1) in the objective of
problem (10), and multiplying this objective by the constant jlog j
f(1)
; problem (10) simples
to
max
X10
log

f (1)
f (X1)

 f(X1)
f (1)
:
Since the average logarithm log(z)
z
is uniquely maximized at z = e; the optimal gift X1
uniquely satises f(X1)
f(1)
= 1
e
.
Proof of Corollary 1. Remark 2 and Lemma 3 remain valid under a minimum wage af-
ter two modications.46 First, a delayed-reward contract C with length T is now dened as
46It is also straightforward to verify that every optimal contract is nite.
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one that, until graduation, grants the novice the smallest allowable consumption wmin each
period. As a result, the expert obtains gross revenues equal to (1 + r) [f(Xt 1)  wmin],
rather than (1 + r)f(Xt 1); during each period t = 2; :::; T: Second, in such a delayed-
reward contract, the novices incentive constraint for period t = 2; :::; T is 1
1 f(Xt 1) +
(1 + r) [f(Xt 1)  wmin]  Vt(C); where VT (C) = 11 f(XT ) + M and Vt(C) is obtained
recursively from
Vt(C) = wmin + Vt+1(C) for t < T:
As a result, equation (14) in the proof of Lemma 3 is replaced by f(Xt)   wmin =
(1  )T tVT (C)   T twmin:
Other than these modications, the proof of the present Corollary is identical to the
proof of Proposition 1, with equation (16) replaced by
f(Xt)  wmin = min

(1  )T tVT (C)  T twmin; f(XT )  wmin
	
for all t < T:
Proof of Proposition 3. After substituting for T (X1; wmin) and multiplying the
objective by ln(1+r)
f(1) wmin ; problem (11) simplies to
max
X10
ln

f (1)  wmin
f (X1)  wmin

 f(X1)  wmin
f (1)  wmin ;
which is uniquely solved when f(X1) wmin
f(1) wmin =
1
e
. Consequently, the length of the appren-
ticeship satises
T (X1; wmin)  1 = ln

f (1)  wmin
f (X1)  wmin

 [ln (1 + r)] 1 = 1jlog j :
Finally, since net output f (Xt)  wmin grows at rate r during training, we obtain
f (Xt)  wmin
f (1)  wmin =
(1 + r)t 1
e
for all t < T (X1; wmin);
which implies that f (Xt) is increasing in wmin for all t < T (X1; wmin).
Proof of Proposition 4. For a xed contract duration T; the experts problem consists
in nding consumption and output paths (ct; yt)
T 1
t=1 (from period T onward the novice
48
produces and consumes f(1)). These paths solve:47
max
(ct;yt)
T 1
t=1
T 1X
t=1
t 1 [yt   ct] +
T 1X
t=1
t

Vt   1
1  u (yt)

;
where t is the Lagrange multiplier for the period t incentive constraint, Vt =
P
t 
 tu (c ),
and the output path is constrained to be nondecreasing and weakly below f(1):We begin
by ignoring these latter two constraints. In the resulting relaxed problem, all incentive
constraints bind (otherwise prots can be raised by raising yt) and the rst-order order
conditions for ct and yt deliver, respectively:
Pt
=1 
t u0 (ct) = 
t 1 and t =
(1 )t 1
u0(yt) .
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After combining these two equalities, and rearranging terms, we obtain ct = (1   ) 1Yt.
Moreover, since the Inada condition u0(0) = 1 implies that yt > 0 for all t < T; the
resulting consumption path is increasing.
It remains to show that focusing on the above relaxed problem is appropriate. On
the one hand, that (yt)
T 1
t=1 is nondecreasing follows from the fact that
1
1 u (yt) = Vt and,
since (ct)
T 1
t=1 is increasing, so is (Vt)
T 1
t=1 . On the other hand, that (yt)
T 1
t=1 is weakly below
f(1) follows from the fact that setting yt = f(1) for some t < T is equivalent to reducing
the contracts duration T from the outset.
Proof of Corollary 2. Dene a relaxed problem (IV) identical to (III) except that the
experts incentive constraints (1) are ignored. We begin by observing that the claims in
Lemmas 2, 3 and Proposition 1 remain valid for every e¢ cient contract (with problem (III)
replacing problem (I) and problem (IV) replacing problem (II)). To see why, notice that
the proof of each of these results is constructed by showing that any contract lacking the
desired properties is Pareto-dominated by a contract (delivering a strictly higher payo¤
for the expert and a weakly higher payo¤ for the novice) that does satisfy them.
Once we restrict to contracts satisfying Proposition 1, the objective in (III), as a
function of X1; becomes
P (X1; 0)| {z }
V1
+ (1  )[T (X1)  1] f(X1)| {z };
1
where T (X1) 1 satises eq. (9). Ignoring the integer constraint for T (X1); this objective
47We have assumed that the expert does not use a bonus (M = 0): The proof that doing so is optimal
is omitted for brevity and is available upon request.
48It also follows from the strict concavity of u that the rst-order conditions are su¢ cient for optimality
of the two paths.
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is uniquely maximized when f(X1)
f(1)
= 1
e
min
n
 

(1 )(1 ) ; e
o
:
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